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Vertical Integration and Bank Performance 
Tom Gellrich, Andreas Hackethal, Markus Holzhäuser 
Johann Wolfgang Goethe University 
Abstract: This paper examines vertical integration and its impact on profitability 
and shareholder value in the global banking industry. We derive a measure for 
vertical integration using a sample of 859 banks from 9 Anglo-Saxon and Euro-
pean countries covering the timeframe 1997-2002. Our results suggest that banks 
either operating on highly integrated or highly disintegrated levels of vertical in-
tegration display superior performance figures and stock market evaluations. Ad-
ditionally, vertically integrated banks show lower levels of firm risk. As our results 
suggest an interrelation between vertical integration and outsourcing, banks need  
clear determined strategies whether to engage into outsourcing activities or not. 
Keywords: Vertical Integration; Bank Performance; Outsourcing 
1 Introduction 
Is vertical integration profitable? Vertical integration involves a variety of com-
plex strategic decisions to be performed by the top-management of companies. 
Corporations and especially banks are concerned with the arbitrary question 
whether they should provide certain goods or services in-house or purchase them 
from outside vendors instead. This complex consideration can be boiled down to a 
plain question – make or buy? [Maho92, Mpoy03, QuHi94] – and what are poten-
tial effects on firm performance? Corporations and especially banks increasingly 
undertake considerations regarding their operational production structures and 
thus inevitably evaluate vertical integration or disintegration. Formerly highly in-
tegrated companies such as banks are becoming less integrated as they increas-
ingly engage into divesting or outsourcing activities [Cald03, CaYo03].  
The objective of this paper is to provide deeper insights into the issue of vertical 
integration in the global banking industry. What is the relationship between out-
sourcing and vertical integration, what are the consequences of different strategies 
regarding vertical integration and finally, how is a bank’s performance impacted 
by different levels of vertical integration (or, in other words, what is the optimal 
size of a bank with regard to firm performance)?  
The performance implications of vertical integration in banking have been debated 
to some extent. However, very little empirical research has been undertaken to de-
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termine whether and to what extent vertical integration influences banks’ financial 
performance. In this study, we have introduced a first intra-industry measure for 
vertical integration in the global banking industry and examined the impact on fi-
nancial performance. 
This paper contributes to the actual discussion regarding the optimal strategic 
alignment of successful banks in the future. Should banks solely focus on their 
traditional core competencies [PrHa90], what is the role of outsourcing [FuMe99, 
QuHi94] and what are potential performance implications [GiRa00, Harr85, 
MaZa85, ReFr90]? Our paper provides a first coherent view between those differ-
ent aspects, integrates “outsourcing” into the broader view of “vertical integra-
tion” in the global banking industry and evaluates potential performance implica-
tions. It suggests viable strategies for both scientists as well as practitioners in or-
der to shape future successful banking organisations. 
The paper is structured as follows: we provide the theoretical foundation of verti-
cal integration, derive a set of hypotheses and give an overview of the current state 
of research. Thereafter we introduce the measure for vertical integration in the 
banking industry. The next section provides information regarding sample designs 
and conducted statistical tests. We then measure vertical integration and related 
performance effects. The paper closes with a discussion and conclusion. 
2 Literature Review 
Measuring vertical integration is central to the empirical investigation of perform-
ance implications of a banking strategy [Pale85]. Concepts of vertical integration 
have received extensive attention in the scientific community for more than the 
past 50 years. As Maddigan and Zaima [MaZa85] point out, one of the difficulties 
is to develop an appropriate empirical measurement which is widely accepted. 
Advantages and disadvantages and the respective implications on firm perform-
ance of different levels of vertical integration have received attention, both from 
scientists as well as from practitioners. A good overview is provided by Harrigan 
[Harr84]. Generally, at least three different measurement methods for vertical in-
tegration can be detected in the empirical literature.  
One category reflects vertical integration by input-output models, a concept which 
is based on works by Leontieff [Leon51]. This concept is also employed by other 
authors [CaBr88, ClCa77, DaMo95, Madd81]. Maddigan [Madd81] praises this 
approach due to its network-characteristics as being more appropriate to conceptu-
alize modern industrial production since a single processing chain is often too nar-
row. Major drawback of this concept is that the required data is difficult to obtain 
or especially in the banking industry not publicly available at all. 
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A second category of literature measures vertical integration as the percentage of 
total production which is part of a company’s vertical chain. This ratio is em-
ployed by Rumelt [Rume74]. Maddigan [Madd81] mentions two problems: the 
ratio can increase as the result of a horizontal merger and the data needed to con-
struct the index requires a breakdown of the total value of production by product 
line, which is often not available in public.  
The third most-widely referred approach is based on pioneering work by Adelman 
[Adel55], Gort [Gort62], and Nelson [Nels63]. The work has been continued and 
extended by Laffer [Laff69], Tucker and Wilder [TuWi77, WiTu84], Levy 
[Levy85], Reed and Fronmueller [ReFr90], and Görzig and Stephan [GöSt02]. 
The link between these studies is a similar approach towards measuring vertical 
integration. All studies employ a ratio of corporate product to corporate sales. The 
ratio is often termed “value-added to sales, VAS”. According to Martin [Mart86] 
VAS is the most common measure of vertical integration in economic research. If 
a firm integrates forwards or backwards (i.e. acquiring customers or suppliers) the 
VAS increases and vice versa. While this index has considerable appeal because 
of its computational properties, several authors [DaMo95, DaRa94, Madd81, 
ReFr90] mention potential drawbacks of this concept: the ratio might be influ-
enced by a company’s profitability and the ratio is sensitive to the stage in the ver-
tical chain at which the firm operates (i.e. it can be greater if the firm is nearer to a 
primary level of production). On the other hand this ratio has the advantage of 
ease of calculation [Madd81, ReFr90] since all computations are based on publicly 
disclosed information by the individual firms. Although we are aware of some 
conceptual drawbacks we have chosen to construct a measure of value added to 
sales (VAS) for the banking industry being introduced in section 3. 
Buzzell [Buzz83] and Maddigan and Zaima [MaZa85] state that higher profitabil-
ity can be observed for firms with high values of vertical integration, measured as 
VAS. A variety of authors [Buzz83, ReFr90, Vese78] provide evidence of the 
problems that might arise when extraneous factors (e.g. industry, firm size, etc.) 
that affect performance are not controlled for. Harrigan [Harr85] suggest that a 
comprehensive investigation of strategic factors is hampered by the high level of 
aggregation of data used in these studies. Several scientists relate the degree of 
vertical integration to industry-specific factors such as number of competitors, 
number of firms on upstream or downstream production levels, demand uncer-
tainty or potentials for synergies with adjacent strategic business units (for a good 
overview see [DaRa94, Harr85, Lieb91, Mart86]). These are external determinants 
which can not be influenced by a specific company. In our paper we propose a dif-
ferent perspective by analyzing different levels of vertical integration in a specific 
industry and relating this integration to firm performance. 
In a corporate strategy study covering multi-industry aspects, Rumelt [Rume74, 
Rume82] found vertically integrated firms to be the poorest performers of all 
companies in the sample. In a single-industry study covering the forest products 
industry, D’Aveni and Illinitch [DaIl92] found vertically integrated companies 
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bear a higher risk of bankruptcy. Vertical integration can influence companies not 
to purchase input resources at the lowest possible prices [Qui+90]. Mahoney 
[Maho92] suggests other costs to be associated with high levels of vertical integra-
tion. Along similar lines of argumentation and findings other scientists to recom-
mend outsourcing strategies or form strategic alliances [Harr85] or disintegrate 
[Barr88]. 
Contrasting this viewpoint, a variety of authors point out the incentive to vertically 
integrate positively impacts cost structures [JoHi88], reduces transaction costs 
[JoHi88, Maho92, Will71, Will79], eliminates upstream market price distortions 
[VeGr71, West81], decreases asymmetric information [Green74], or protects ac-
cess to proprietary technology [JoHi88]. Vertical integration can also have posi-
tive impact on a firm’s profit by allowing price discrimination [Perr80], creating 
barriers to entry [SaSc83], or enhancing a company’s power over suppliers and 
buyers [Port80].  
Controlling for industry, firm size and strategic posture, Reed and Fronmueller 
[ReFr90] find minor and non-significant performance differentials between verti-
cally integrated and non-vertically integrated firms. They conclude that the strat-
egy of vertical integration in itself does not produce superior levels of profitabil-
ity, growth and does not impact a firm’s risk level. Controlling for industry effects 
and economies of scope and scale D’Aveni and Ravenscraft [DaRa94] find that 
vertically integrated lines of business display performance increases but show 
higher production costs, thus resulting in only marginally better profitability than 
non-integrated lines of business in the same industry. Higher production costs can 
be associated to backward vertical integration, suggesting insulation from market 
pressures. Forward vertical integration is associated with lower transaction costs. 
Fixler and Siegel [FiSi99] analyze outsourcing in the service sector and conclude 
that outsourcing has reduced service sector productivity in the short run. Using a 
sample of the manufacturing industry, Gilley and Rasheed [GiRa00] find that 
firms pursuing more intense outsourcing strategies do not experience significant, 
direct performance impacts on the overall firm. They indicate that it might well be 
that sourcing activities have an effect on the individual functional areas in which 
they occur. Analysing data from the German manufacturing industry, Kinkel and 
Lay [KiLa03] find that higher degrees of vertical integration result in superior lev-
els of firm performance, innovation activities and flexibility.  
In sum, this discussion leaves the question, what impact a firm’s vertical integra-
tion in this case of banks on firm performance has. We address this issue by using 
a unique set of data extracted from Bankscope and applying a measure of vertical 
integration proposed by Tucker and Wilder [TuWi77]. 
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3 Measuring Vertical Integration 
Applying VAS, Tucker and Wilder [TuWi77] calculate value added of a specific 
firm as the sum of depreciation and amortization, interest expense, labour, incen-
tive, pension and retirement expense, income taxes, net income, and rental ex-
pense. 
Obviously, adaptations are to be made for our sample covering the banking indus-
try. Depreciation and amortization are replaced by Loan Loss Provisions (LLP), 
labour expenses include expenses for incentives and pensions. Rental expenses 
can not be calculated since they are not publicly available. We calculate the value 
added as the sum of loan loss provisions (LLP), fixed charges and interest ex-
penses (IE), labour expenses (LE), income taxes (IT), and net income (after tax) 
(NIAT). Thus, the value added of firm i in a given year j is calculated as:  
jijijijijiji NIATITLEIELLPVA ,,,,,, ++++=  
Similar to Tucker and Wilder [TuWi77] our vertical integration index for firm i in 
year j is then defined as the ratio of value added to net sales (raw vertical integra-
tion index, RVI): 
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,
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Sales for bank i in year j are defined as the sum of Interest Income (IIn), Fee In-
come (FIn), Commission Income (CIn), Trading Income (TIn), and other income 
(OIn): 
jijijijijiji OInTInCInFInIInSales ,,,,,, ++++=  
In accordance with Tucker and Wilder [TuWi77] we eliminate the effect of static 
differences and trends in profitability and effects of changing depreciation and 
other tax laws, we construct the Adjusted Vertical Integration Index (AVI) for 
firm I in year j as follows: 
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,,,
,,,
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+−=  
The AVI can be viewed as a more conceptually sound method of measuring trends 
in vertical integration, since it removes the effect of trends in profitability and 
taxation [TuWi77]. For this paper we will use AVI to measure vertical integration. 
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4 Theories and Hypotheses 
Economists and strategic management researchers agree that there are many pos-
sible motives for vertical integration [Maho92]. Integration may be induced by 
transaction costs, imperfect competition, imperfect information and a variety of 
other factors [Lieb91, Maho89]. Also macroeconomic variables such as industry 
characteristics and structures can influence vertical integration [Harr85, Mart86, 
Mpoy03, ViWa91]. Vertical integration can be defined as the number of activities 
along the value chain that are performed within a single company [Mpoy03] or the 
stages of production that are under the legal and financial control of a single firm. 
Firms can use a variety of strategic levers and forms of cooperation with other 
companies which impact their vertical integration. Apart from mergers and acqui-
sitions or establishing completely new firms, joint ventures and other hybrid forms 
of cooperation with other companies can be undertaken as well as outsourcing of 
business areas or decisions to divest. As motivated above, this paper solely fo-
cuses on the interrelation between vertical integration and outsourcing and the im-
pact on the banking value chain and performance. 
For this study we follow Bartell [Bart98]: “In its most vanilla, operational terms, 
outsourcing is synonymous with contracting out, any or all of an in-house function 
to a third party. […] In sum, outsourcing is any change in the provision of goods 
and services from in-house capabilities to a third-party.” Thus, outsourcing di-
rectly influences a firm’s structure of vertical integration. 
Hypothesis 1: Outsourcing and vertical integration are directly interrelated. 
Banks engaging in outsourcing activities have a lower level of vertical inte-
gration. 
Outsourcing offers a variety of advantages. One of the most cited [Luk+02] is the 
potential for savings and the flexibilization of formerly fixed cost structures, di-
rectly influencing a firm’s financial performance.  
Hypothesis 2: Outsourcing and profitability are positively correlated. We ex-
pect that banks actively engaging in sourcing activities show a positive finan-
cial performance in terms of ROE and operating ROE. 
In principal, institutional economics and production theories provide a valid 
framework to analyze the rationale behind a company’s decision to vertically inte-
grate or disintegrate.  
Resource-based theory (RBT) views a firm as a collection of productive resources 
[Che+95]. A company’s growth and success are interrelated to utilization of its 
best resources. Barney [Barn91] and Cheong et.al. [Che+95] attribute four criteria 
to the resources if they are to provide sustained competitive advantage: Value, 
rareness, imperfect immutability and non-substitutability. Grant [Gran91] states 
that a resource-based approach to strategy is concerned not only with the deploy-
ment of existing resources, but also with the development of the firm’s resources 
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and capabilities. In order to fully exploit the firm’s existing resources and capa-
bilities, a firm needs to focus on its core competencies. Thus external acquisition 
of complementary resources and capabilities may be necessary to fill the differ-
ence between a firm’s desired and actual capabilities. According to RBT, banks 
can reach a superior level of production or performance when the best resources 
are leveraged in-house and all complementary and non-core activities are sourced 
externally. This implies that firms can not cover all stages of the value chain; in-
stead corporations focus on their core capabilities and use external vendors to sup-
ply complementary goods. 
Hypothesis 3: Focusing on core competencies implies less vertically integrated 
production structures and leads to superior competitive advantage. Less ver-
tical integration thus results in superior financial performance in terms of 
ROE and operating ROE.  
Transaction cost economics (TCE) was introduced by Coase [Coas37] and devel-
oped by Williamson [Will75, Will79, Will81]. Principally, TCE focus on two 
types of cost: Production cost and transaction cost. Economically successful com-
panies maintain their position through a superior balance of production cost 
against transaction cost. Thus, focus is on production and efficient management of 
transactions. These are defined as exchanging goods or services within the organi-
zation or between the organization and the external world. Transaction costs in-
crease as a result of three factors: asset specificity of the individual resource to the 
firm, uncertainty regarding the environment and infrequency regarding the com-
monness. A first intuitive suggestion could lead to the idea that less direct finan-
cial and legal control results in higher transaction costs. This suggestion is also 
supported by the agency cost theory (ACT), developed by Ross [Ross73] and per-
petuated by Jensen and Meckling [JeMe76]. ACT focuses on determining the most 
efficient contract that governs the relationship between a principal and an agent. 
The choice between a behaviour-based contract (e.g. hierarchy, vertical integra-
tion) and outcome-based contract (e.g. market, vertical disintegration) depends on 
the agency costs, which are costs incurred as a result of discrepancies between the 
objectives of the principal and those of agents. Thus, agency costs are the sum of 
the principal’s monitoring costs, bonding costs by the agent and the residual loss 
of the principal. Agency costs increase when principals exert less direct control 
over the agent. ACT suggests that firms are more prone to vertically disintegrate 
when agency costs are low and contract enforcement between principal and agent 
is easy. 
Banks need to strategically determine whether the appropriate governance struc-
ture for a transaction is a market (i.e. less control over resources) or a hierarchy 
(i.e. increased control over resources). Vertical disintegration implicates lower 
production cost but higher transaction cost and risks arising from negotiation, 
monitoring and enforcing contracts with other, external levels of production 
[Che+95]. Each of these factors raises the effort and cost as well as potential risks 
of structuring an agreement between an organization and external producers that 
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will assure the successful completion of the contract and its future enforcement. 
TCE recommends vertically integrating production for highly specific and critical 
products and applying less vertical integration for non-specific and uncritical 
products. In order to substitute for actual vertical ownership and direct control ver-
tical contracts can be employed [Laf+84, Maho92]. 
Hypothesis 4: If TCE and ACT hold, then less vertical integration imply the 
need for more vertical contracting and negotiations with external suppliers, 
subsequently leading to increased transaction and agency costs. These in-
creased costs ultimately lead to a decrease in overall firm performance. 
Hypothesis 5: Less vertical integration implies increased organizational and 
strategic risks (i.e. through dependencies on external production levels, neces-
sary negotiations and monitoring expenses). We thus expect banks displaying 
a low level of vertical integration to bear increased risk in terms of beta-
factors and standard deviation of returns. 
Production cost advantages are another influential factor determining vertical in-
tegration or sourcing decisions of corporations [AnSt98, WaWe87]. Production 
cost advantages are driven by economies of skill, economies of scale and econo-
mies of scope [BaPa82]. Economies of skill define the position of the cost func-
tion. Economies of scale are mainly realized by fix cost degression and learning 
curve effects (i.e. decreasing average unit costs when expanding the output) 
[BaPa82]. Economies of scope are realized where it is less costly to combine two 
or more product lines in one firm than to produce them separately [PaWi81]. In 
this paper we follow the argumentation line of Berger et. al. [Ber+93], Berger and 
Mester [BeMe97] or Hughes et. al. [Hug+01] who detected increasing economies 
of scale, leading to the conclusion that larger banks are more efficient than smaller 
banks. For larger banks thus outsourcing does not provide any further significant 
impact on firm performance. Thus we assume that larger banks show less en-
gagement in sourcing activities resulting in a higher level of vertical integration. 
Hypothesis 6: Provided that economies of scale exist in banking we expect 
larger banks to have a higher level of vertical integration. 
One of the most influential factors for capital markets is a specific company’s fi-
nancial performance especially future outlook and growth potential. Provided that 
outsourcing and vertical disintegration positively impacts firm performance, in-
vestors thus tend to overweigh shares of institutions displaying increased sourcing 
activities. Thus the specific company’s price-book-multiple is raised. 
Hypothesis 7: Investors tend to react positively on sourcing activities in bank-
ing since they are expected to lead to increased profitability of the respective 
institution. We thus expect banks displaying increased sourcing activities (or 
lower a level of vertical integration) to show higher price-book-ratios. 
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5 Sample Design and Statistical Tests 
In order to construct a measure for vertical integration we have to rely on account-
ing data. We chose the Bankscope database as basis for our calculations. This da-
tabase contains accounting data for banks as well as stock price information which 
allow us to evaluate the market performance of firms with different levels of verti-
cal integration.  
We extracted a panel sample of up to 907 banks covering the timeframe 1995 to 
2002 and the countries USA, Canada, Australia, UK (Anglo-Saxon), Germany, 
France, Spain, Italy and Switzerland (Continental European). We excluded Japan 
from the calculation because both, levels of vertical integration and profitability 
were strongly influenced by the Asian crisis in 1998 and the subsequent economic 
depression afterwards. Due to mergers and acquisitions the number of banks is not 
stable during the observation timeframe. We established a minimum threshold of 
total assets exceeding 1bn USD at least for one year during the timeframe for each 
bank to be eligible for the sample. In case of a merger, the acquiring bank is main-
tained in the sample while the target is excluded from the day of acquisition on-
wards. Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics for our sample. All variables re-
late to the total sample consisting of all banks in the respective years 1997-2002. 
For each bank in the sample the average number of observations is 6.1 in the total 
observation timeframe.  
To avoid a bias of the results we used the windsorizing method to remove outliers 
for all important variables. We set the variable values of the top 0.5% and the bot-
tom 0.5% of the sample to the lowest respective highest value of the percentile.  
We test the hypotheses described above by running multivariate panel OLS re-
gressions. In all regressions we have a multiple number of banks and a maximum 
of eight available years. In all cases we estimate fixed effects panels. 
6 Vertical Integration in the Banking Industry 
Table 2 presents the development of the vertical integration measures between 
1995 and 2002. The average value for the raw vertical integration (RVI) index in 
our sample is 83.9% and for the adjusted vertical integration (AVI) index is 
80.8%. Generally, the AVI is about 3-4 percentage points lower than the RVI. 
This is due to the subtraction of the net income and taxes in the calculation term. 
The AVI dropped by 5.0 percentage points from 82.2% in 1995 to 77.2% in 2002. 
This complies with our hypothesis of declining integration due to an increase in 
outsourcing activities and concentration on core competencies of banks in the last 
decade. Due to a negative trading income it is possible that banks show values of 
vertical integration above 1. 
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In comparison to other industries this level of vertical integration seems extraordi-
nary high. [Madd81] derives at a raw index of vertical integration of approxi-
mately 41% in the timeframe between 1953 and 1973 for the manufacturing indus-
try. An even more appealing example is the automobile industry. Due to the strong 
reliance on suppliers the industry has an even lower level of vertical integration, 
e.g. only 20% of the new Smart Car by DaimlerChrysler is produced internally.  
Analyzing vertical integration in banking by countries displays a decline in the 
index over the last years (Table 3). This tendency is especially significant in Swit-
zerland, Germany and Italy. All of these countries had a relatively high AVI in 
1995. For the Anglo-Saxon countries we notice a rather stable development. The 
AVI for the USA declined only by 1 percentage points in the timeframe while the 
Canadian index increased slightly. However, the AVI for Anglo-Saxon countries 
lies below the value of the central European countries. This finding can be partly 
explained by increased outsourcing activities especially in the USA. In Europe 
outsourcing used to be not so common in the late 90s and has just gained pace in 
the last couple of years [FrGe03].  
Comparing AVI of investment and commercial banks shows a higher vertical in-
tegration for the latter group, while the overall trend of vertical integration is de-
creasing for both bank types. Investment banks are defined as the top percentile 
regarding the share of commission and trading income on total operating income 
in our sample. Commercial banks are defined as top percentile regarding the share 
of interest income on total operating income. A similar approach to differentiate 
both bank types has been undertaken by Beitel et. al. [Bei+04]. Table 4 provides 
an overview for investment banks and commercial banks.  
In addition to the analysis of bank types we measured the different levels of verti-
cal integration of diversified and specialized banks. Our separation method is 
based on a methodology introduced by Elsas et. al. [Els+04]. They measure corpo-
rate diversification using a Herfindahl-Index which measures the concentration of 
the different income streams (interest, commission, trading and other income) as 
fraction of total operating income. Diversified banks will have a low Herfindahl 
Index because of their multiple businesses. The top percentile diversified banks 
(horizontally integrated) operate significantly less vertically integrated than the 
top percentile of specialized banks as shown in Table 5.  
Our data set provides strong evidence that the level vertical integration in the 
global banking industry is much higher than in other industries. In the next chapter 
we will extend the analysis to evaluate the value consequences of different levels 
of vertical integration.  
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7 Performance Effects 
7.1 Variables 
To evaluate performance effects of vertical integration and outsourcing in the 
global banking industry we have conducted several panel regression analyses.  
We use the accounting based performance measures pre-tax return on equity 
(ROE) and operating return on equity (OPROE) to determine the profitability of 
the banks in our sample. Additionally, we use the price/book-ratio (PB) as a proxy 
for the shareholder value consequences. Price/book is defined as market value of 
the banks equity over the book value of the equity. A higher P/B indicates a higher 
valuation of the company on stock markets. Obviously the use of this ratio reduces 
the sample size as it can only be determined for listed companies. Especially in 
Europe the fraction of listed banks is much smaller than in the USA. To evaluate 
the consequences of different levels of vertical integration on the cost and risk 
structure, we use the ratio of costs to assets as a proxy for the cost structure and 
the standard deviation of the banks ROE of the last four years as dependent vari-
able regarding the risk. 
In addition to the measures for vertical integration (adjusted index, AVI) and out-
sourcing activities we include several control variables into the regression to sepa-
rate and control for the influence of vertical integration and outsourcing on the de-
pendent variables.  
In order to account for risks that banks bear, we include operating leverage 
(OPLEV) as a measure for business risk and the equity/asset ratio as a measure for 
financial risk into our model. To combine the two effects it is useful to control for 
the standard deviation of the ROE as a measure for total risk. Because this meas-
ure requires the ROE of at least four to five years the sample size would be de-
creased significantly. We therefore calculated two models for each dependent 
variable to avoid misinterpretations. To measure the varying degree of risk in the 
credit portfolio we controlled for the ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans. 
To control for operating efficiency we used for different levels of the cost/income-
ratio (ratio of total operating costs over total operating income). Additionally we 
included the variable size (log(assets)) to account for the consequences of differ-
ent scale of businesses. 
Due to the fact that a high vertical integration is often associated with a high de-
gree of diversification we explicitly controlled for diversification. To measure a 
bank’s diversification we use the Herfindahl-index introduced in section 5. 
To shed further light on the interrelation between outsourcing and vertical integra-
tion we analyzed outsourcing activities of the banks in the sample. We relied on 
data also used in a study by Friedrich and Gellrich [FrGe03] which contains out-
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sourcing deals of the global banking industry between 1996 and 2002. All in-
cluded outsourcing deals have a contract value of at least 10m USD. 
7.2 Results 
As stated in Hypothesis 1 we expect that outsourcing activities result in lower lev-
els of vertical integration. Table 6 shows that the dummy variable for outsourcing 
activities has a negative coefficient which is significant at the 99% confidence 
level. Thus our data set does provide support for Hypothesis 1. Another interesting 
finding in the table is the relationship between specialization and vertical integra-
tion. The coefficient for the Herfindahl-index income is positive and significant. 
Thus specialized banks tend to be more vertically integrated.  
According to Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3 we expected on one hand that in-
creased outsourcing activities or less vertical integration and a bank’s profitability 
are positively correlated. On the other hand, Hypothesis 4 postulates higher trans-
action costs for less vertical integrated banks leading to an overall decrease in 
profitability. Table 7 (models 1-4) shows two panel regression models displaying 
the dummy variable for outsourcing activities and the adjusted vertical integration 
(AVI) index and their effect on profitability measures (Operating ROE and ROE). 
We included the square of the vertical integration index (AVI2) to account for a 
possible non-linearity of the variable. We detect no significant influence of out-
sourcing activities on the profitability of a bank. Thus we have to reject Hypothe-
sis 2. 
AVI and AVI2 have a significant impact on both, OpROE and ROE. Interpreting 
the two variables shows a favourable effect of vertical integration for highly inte-
grated and highly disintegrated banks. The banks that are “stuck in the middle” 
display the lowest profitability measures. The favourable effect for the highly in-
tegrated banks can be explained by decreased transaction cost and agency cost due 
to the limited dependency on suppliers. These cost savings outweigh increased 
production costs and the possibility that these banks are not as flexible on the costs 
side compared to vertically disintegrated banks. The argumentation line for highly 
disintegrated banks is vice versa: vastly relying on outside suppliers results in a 
more flexible cost structure and thus benefits their profitability. This positive ef-
fect outweighs higher transaction costs, agency costs and potential moral hazard 
issues due to asymmetric information between the bank and the supply side. 
Banks that have only an average (or mediocre) level of vertical integration are not 
able to exploit the benefits of either vertical integration or disintegration. Our re-
sults for hypotheses 3 and 4 are somehow ambiguous: For highly disintegrated 
banks our findings support Hypothesis 3, for highly integrated banks our findings 
support Hypothesis 4. The average AVI in our sample is 80.9 per cent. The lowest 
profitability can be detected for banks having an AVI between 54 – 60 per cent. 
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Only 84 banks in our sample have an AVI less than 54 per cent. These banks are 
mostly direct brokers or internet banks, as well as pure transaction banks.  
Following our results we derive two successful business models – the “full-
control”-model and the “network”-model. “Full control” relates to highly inte-
grated banks that benefit from standardized, streamlined and homogenous proc-
esses, products and interfaces. Due to their integrated organizational form they ex-
ert high levels of control thus benefiting from homogeneous and less complex 
communication and workflows. The “network” model on the other hand relates to 
banks working on a very low level of vertical integration. These organizations 
benefit from similar efficient production structures, processes, interfaces to their 
external suppliers and products. In order to provide best-of-breed products regard-
ing service and quality to their customers these organizations have to be able to 
communicate quickly with their external suppliers and adapt immediately to 
changes in the external vendor universe. Nonetheless one has to keep in mind that 
the overall level of standardization and commoditization of process chains and 
products in the banking industry is much lower than e.g. in the chemical or manu-
facturing industry. Ultimately this still leads to over-proportional costs of transact-
ing, contracting and monitoring in the banking industry. It seems that the often re-
ferred term of “industrializing the banking industry” is not easy to implement and 
when comparing the banking industry to other industry role models one needs to 
bear in mind the complexity of process chains and the challenges to integrate and 
standardize. Consequently, as our findings implicate, banks should strive for more 
standards and homogenization of processes and products, even if they are cur-
rently working on a profitable basis. 
Hypothesis 5 suggests that lower levels of vertical integration should be associated 
with higher levels of risk due to higher uncertainty regarding external partners, 
less potential for control and increased propensity of moral hazard. Model 5 in 
Table 7 shows the according regression. We used the standard deviation of the 
ROE as measure for the total risk of the bank. In our data we find significant rela-
tionship between vertical integration and risk. 
According Hypothesis 6 we expected larger banks to be more vertically integrated 
due to the reason that they have already achieved a reasonable size allowing them 
to fully exploit economies of scale. In contradiction to this, smaller banks should 
more rely on other means of achieving this production cost economies. Our results 
support this hypothesis (see Table 6). The coefficient of the variable log(assets), 
which corresponds to the size of the bank, has a positive sign and is highly signifi-
cant. Thus, our data supports the hypothesis that larger banks have a higher level 
of vertical integration. 
Our final Hypothesis 7 suggests that shortening the value chain by vertical disin-
tegration should positively affect investor’s reaction on stock markets. Thus we 
conduct regression analysis of the adjusted vertical integration index and the 
dummy variable for outsourcing activities on the average price/book-ratio of the 
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banks. Results are presented in Table 7 (model 5 and 6). Our findings provide evi-
dence for a significant interrelationship between vertical integration and market 
valuation. Basically, we derive at the same result as for the profitability measures. 
Highly integrated and highly disintegrated banks experience a positive impact on 
P/B. Thus, in order to be rewarded by capital markets, banks need to define and 
communicate clear strategic objectives: Operate either on a highly integrated or 
highly disintegrated basis, but avoid to be stuck in the middle. Thus we can not 
find clear support in our data set regarding Hypothesis 7. 
8 Discussion and Conclusion 
As Maddigan and Zaima [MaZa85] point out, the way vertical integration is 
measured does affect the interpretation of the optimal degree of integration.  
Our results provide strong and convincing evidence as well as strategic advice for 
banks how to shape and align their organizational structures. Outsourcing is one 
way to influence a firm’s vertical integration – but it is not an end in itself. Banks 
operating on an either highly integrated or highly disintegrated level are rewarded 
both in terms of superior financial performance and capital market valuation. 
Characteristics and determinants under which these firms operate are to some ex-
tent similar: Processes are streamlined, standardized and show low complexity, 
interfaces (either internal or to outside suppliers) are integrated, homogenous and 
standardized resulting in superior services and products for their customers. Banks 
that are currently “stuck in the middle” in terms of their vertical integration need 
to define and communicate viable strategic objectives – either fully “control” op-
erations or engage in “networking” organizations relying heavily on outside sup-
pliers. 
Being restricted to publicly available balance sheet data of the banks in our sam-
ple, we had to pursue the pragmatic approach of employing VAS as the only 
available measurement concept. Further research is needed in order to provide 
other measurement concepts for the banking industry thus enabling a more com-
prehensive definition of the “optimal” degree of vertical integration. Another sub-
ject for future work is the interrelation between VAS and the influencing vari-
ables. One could assume that the main driver is labour expenses which can mainly 
be influenced by sourcing activities of the respective bank.  
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10 Appendix 
Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
ROE 5504 0.213 0.115 -0.306 0.728
OPROE 5504 0.163 0.121 -0.764 0.595
Price/Book 1624 2.020 1.590 0.090 11.720
Raw vertical integration 5504 0.840 0.091 0.313 1.153
Adjusted Vertical integration 5504 0.809 0.103 0.290 1.220
Involved in Outsourcing Activities 5504 0.025 0.156 0.000 1.000
Herfindahl Index Income 5504 0.723 0.140 0.288 1.000
Cost/income 5504 0.638 0.153 0.225 1.556
log(assets) 5504 8.735 1.673 0.786 14.002
Equity/assets 5504 0.079 0.038 0.013 0.287
St.Dev. ROE 2563 0.048 0.124 0.002 1.226
LLP/loans 5504 0.003 0.056 -0.753 0.122
Dummy for Commercial bank 5504 0.099 0.299 0.000 1.000
Dummy for Investment bank 5504 0.079 0.270 0.000 1.000
Dummy for 2002 5504 0.096 0.295 0.000 1.000
Dummy for 2001 5504 0.136 0.342 0.000 1.000
Dummy for 2000 5504 0.141 0.348 0.000 1.000
Dummy for 1999 5504 0.142 0.349 0.000 1.000
Dummy for 1998 5504 0.130 0.337 0.000 1.000
Dummy for 1997 5504 0.126 0.332 0.000 1.000
Dummy for 1996 5504 0.118 0.323 0.000 1.000
Dummy for 1995 5504 0.112 0.315 0.000 1.000   
Table 1: Sample descriptive statistics 
Average 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
ppt.change 
95-02
Raw vertical integration index 83.9% 85.0% 84.2% 84.7% 83.9% 83.7% 84.8% 83.7% 81.5% -3.5%
Adjusted vertical integration index 80.8% 82.2% 81.3% 81.8% 80.8% 80.2% 81.9% 80.9% 77.2% -5.0%
N 615 649 695 717 780 774 746 528  
Table 2: Development of vertical integration 
share of obs. 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
USA 45.7% 80.6% 80.6% 82.0% 81.3% 81.5% 82.8% 81.6% 79.6%
Canada 1.2% 88.2% 74.0% 73.7% 74.1% 74.6% 77.1% 75.7% 76.7%
Australia 2.8% 87.7% 87.0% 85.9% 84.0% 82.7% 83.8% 82.6% 80.0%
UK 10.8% 85.0% 83.7% 84.4% 85.4% 84.1% 85.3% 83.5% 81.1%
Average anglo-saxon 85.4% 81.3% 81.5% 81.2% 80.7% 82.3% 80.9% 79.4%
Germany 7.1% 87.9% 86.5% 87.2% 84.8% 84.0% 83.3% 83.1% 83.7%
France 14.2% 88.9% 86.6% 87.2% 85.7% 84.2% 84.9% 85.4% 83.9%
Switzerland 2.5% 82.5% 82.1% 79.9% 79.8% 80.6% 82.5% 79.7% 69.2%
Spain 8.4% 89.3% 86.4% 83.7% 82.0% 81.4% 87.0% 86.6% 85.5%
Italy 7.3% 87.7% 87.0% 85.9% 84.0% 82.7% 83.8% 82.6% 80.0%
Average continental europe 87.3% 85.7% 84.8% 83.3% 82.6% 84.3% 83.5% 80.5%  
Table 3: International comparison of vertical integration (AVI) 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Investment Bank 84.2% 79.6% 81.0% 80.4% 79.6% 82.1% 79.7% 76.3%
Commercial Bank 90.8% 89.8% 90.0% 89.6% 87.3% 90.2% 91.5% 88.7%  
Table 4: Vertical integration of investment and commercial banks (AVI) (top and bottom 
percentile) 
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1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Diversified Banks 77.2% 75.6% 76.8% 75.6% 75.8% 77.4% 73.5% 68.5%
Specialized Banks 90.9% 89.5% 89.2% 89.1% 86.7% 88.9% 88.6% 86.2%  
Table 5: Vertical integration of specialized vs. diversified banks (AVI) (top and bottom 
percentile) 
Involved in Outsourcing Activities -0.027 ***
Herfindahl Index Income 0.151 ***
log(assets) 0.017 ***
Dummy for Investment bank 0.005
Dummy for Commercial bank 0.013 ***
Dummy for 2002 -0.031 ***
Dummy for 2001 -0.005
Dummy for 2000 0.005
Dummy for 1999 -0.011 ***
Dummy for 1998 -0.007 **
Dummy for 1997 -0.001
Dummy for 1996 -0.006 *
Constant 0.552 ***
N 5504
Groups 907
R² 0.0867
F-Test 36.29 ***
Adjusted Vertical integration
 
Table 6: Outsourcing and vertical integration: panel regression 1995-2002 
Adjusted Vertical integration -0.515 *** -1.460 *** -0.910 *** -2.092 *** -0.370 ** -10.175 *** -5.348
avi^2 0.476 *** 1.081 *** 0.714 *** 1.462 *** 0.255 *** 5.825 ** 4.163 *
Involved in Outsourcing Activities -0.001 -0.005 -0.005 -0.014 0.014 0.148 -0.124
Herfindahl Index Income -0.100 *** -0.163 *** -0.145 *** -0.221 *** -0.054 -0.767 -1.070 **
log(assets) -0.008 *** -0.016 * -0.014 *** -0.030 *** -0.027 *** -1.994 *** -1.706 ***
Cost/income -0.306 *** -0.266 *** -0.454 *** -0.424 *** -3.229 *** -1.418 ***
Equity/assets -0.046 -0.040 -0.307 *** -0.486 *** -0.349 *** -20.765 *** -16.729 ***
LLP/loans -0.196 *** -0.306 *** -0.263 *** -0.408 *** 0.081 ** 3.388 *** 7.168 ***
St.Dev. ROE -0.271 *** -0.284 *** 0.139
Dummy for Investment bank 0.020 *** 0.036 *** 0.020 ** 0.033 *** 0.004 0.158 0.090
Dummy for Commercial bank -0.002 0.011 0.005 0.023 ** 0.005 0.219 0.058
Dummy for 2002 -0.015 *** -0.019 -0.030 *** -0.033 * -0.018 -0.029
Dummy for 2001 -0.008 * -0.013 -0.017 *** -0.023 -0.021 -0.073 -0.101 *
Dummy for 2000 -0.001 -0.009 -0.004 -0.012 -0.024 -0.070 -0.085
Dummy for 1999 0.006 -0.001 0.006 -0.003 -0.032 ** -0.130 -0.088
Dummy for 1998 0.000 -0.010 0.000 -0.011 -0.031 ** 0.031 0.184
Dummy for 1997 -0.001 -0.010 -0.002 -0.019 -0.014 3.703 ***
Dummy for 1996 -0.002 0.018 -0.001 0.021 0.006 -0.710 ***
Dummy for 1995
Dummy for 1994
Dummy for 1993
Dummy for 1992
Dummy for 1991
Constant 0.550 *** 1.020 *** 0.974 *** 1.638 *** 0.504 *** 29.087 *** 22.459 ***
N 5504 2563 5504 2563 2563 1624 956
Groups 907 730 907 730 730 357 291
R² 0.2154 0.2826 0.2767 0.3389 0.0271 0.3636 0.417
F-Test 73.96 *** 39.72 *** 103.05 *** 51.68 *** 3.16 *** 44.67 *** 29.01 ***
St.Dev. ROE
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
ROE Price/BookPrice/BookOPROEOPROEROE
 
Table 7: Vertical integration and profitability: panel regression 1995-2002 
Notes: */**/*** significant 10/5/1% level 
